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ABSTRACT
I use a detailed panel of data and a unique modeling specification to explore how public
schoolteachers respond to the incentives embedded in North Carolina’s retirement system.
Like most public-sector retirement plans, North Carolina’s teacher pension implicitly
encourages teachers to continue working until they are eligible for their pension benefits,
and then leave soon afterward. I find that teachers with higher levels of quality, as measured
by a teacher’s value-added to her students’ achievement test scores, are more responsive to
the “pull” of teacher pensions. Younger teachers, those with higher salaries, and nonwhite
teachers are also more likely to stay during the pension “pull.” All teachers show a strong
response to the pension “push,” with about a quarter of teachers leaving every year once
they become eligible for their pension. I depart from other models of teacher retirement by
using a Cox proportional hazard model. Given that salaries are generally fixed by the state, I
find that the number of years a teacher must work before she is eligible for her full pension
benefit is the major driver of variation in pension wealth. This specification has the benefit
of a flexible baseline hazard that can easily capture the sharp incentives driving a teacher’s
retirement decision that are dependent on her proximity to retirement eligibility, and can
flexibly account for differences driven by local labor market conditions. These analyses
highlight important unintended effects that inform education policies going forward to
ensure the retention of high-quality teachers in all types of schools.
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Are Teacher Pensions “Hazardous” for Schools?
Retirement of experienced teachers could have negative consequences on student
learning and further exacerbate the disproportionate demand for high-quality teachers in
disadvantaged schools. Many public pension systems provide incentives for teachers as young as
age 50 to retire. States are considering, or have recently enacted, changes to these pension
systems for purely fiscal reasons, ignoring how these changes might affect the retention of
effective teachers who have important impacts on student learning or staffing in hard-to-staff
schools.
Teacher pension funds fall short of their liabilities by an estimated $1 trillion, causing
many states to consider cost-saving changes, including restructuring their plans (Pew Center on
the States 2010). Traditionally, public schoolteachers in almost every state have been covered
under a defined benefit pension plan, which is markedly different from the defined contribution
plans (e.g., a 401[k]) offered in most private-sector jobs. Defined benefit plans provide teachers
with a fixed annuity paid regularly over their retirement after they have reached certain ageexperience thresholds. In contrast, a defined contribution plan puts money aside in an account
that can be accessed by the individual after retirement but does not provide any incentive to retire
in one particular year or the next. The present structure of defined benefit plans provides
incentives to “pull” midcareer individuals toward continuing teaching, while “pushing” latercareer teachers out of the profession. These incentives may affect the retirement behavior of
teachers differently depending on their alternative career options or enjoyment of teaching. This
in turn could increase the challenges in already hard-to-staff schools or degrade the overall
quality of education. Therefore, one must ask, “How responsive are teachers to the pull and push
of pension incentives? Do teachers with different characteristics (qualifications, effectiveness,
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demographics) have different responses to pension incentives? Do teachers in different school
environments (in terms of student racial or ethnic composition, student poverty, or grade level)
have different responses to pension incentives?”
I find that teachers are very responsive to the pull of teacher pensions, with fewer
than 6 percent of teachers leaving each year. Teachers with higher levels of quality,
measured by a teacher’s value-added (the amount she contributes to her students’
achievement test scores), are more responsive to the pull of teacher pensions, perhaps
because they find teaching more satisfying. Teachers who are younger, have higher salaries,
or are nonwhite are less likely to retire than their counterparts. Teachers with advanced
degrees or those who attended either more competitive or less competitive colleges are more
likely to retire than those with bachelor’s degrees or those who attended colleges rated as
being of average competitiveness. Teachers in schools with a higher proportion of students
who are economically disadvantaged are more likely to leave. Middle-school teachers are
more likely to retire than elementary or high-school teachers and seem to be particularly
sensitive to the racial composition of their school, as more of them exit during the pension
pull at schools that have a larger proportion of black students.
All teachers show a strong response to the pension push, with about a fourth of
teachers leaving every year once they become eligible for their pension. High- and lowvalue-added teachers exit at similar rates. As with the pension pull, teachers who are young,
have higher salaries, or are nonwhite are more likely to stay. Teachers who attended less
competitive colleges are more likely to stay during the pension push, perhaps because they
have fewer alternative career opportunities. Middle-school teachers in schools with a large
proportion of black students who are still teaching during the pension push are less likely to
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leave (as many of those have already left prior to pension eligibility), while middle- and
high-school teachers in schools with a large proportion of economically disadvantaged
students are more likely to leave.
My theoretical model differs from the canonical models that have been used to study
retirement because I include nonpecuniary benefits from work and utilize a different estimation
strategy. Teachers are paid according to a rigid salary schedule, so these nonmonetary factors are
an important extension to explain differences in retirement behavior that cannot be explained by
differences in compensation. I estimate a teacher’s propensity to retire using a Cox proportional
hazard model, which changes the effective unit of analysis from a teacher’s year-by-year
retirement decision to a teacher’s entire spell of employment. For example, a logit or probit
identifies what factors are associated with retirement in a particular year, while a proportional
hazard model identifies what factors are associated with shorter careers. A Cox proportional
hazard model has the benefit of a flexible baseline hazard that can easily capture the sharp
incentives driving a teacher’s retirement decision that are dependent on her proximity to
retirement eligibility, and can flexibly account for differences in this hazard rate driven by local
labor market conditions that vary by year and region.
Given that salaries are generally fixed by the state, I find that the number of years a
teacher must work before she is eligible for her full pension benefit is the major driver of
variation in pension wealth. In North Carolina, eligibility for full pension benefits occurs at
set age-experience combinations. I define the unit of time as the number of years until full
pension receipt eligibility, which means all teachers who have the same number of years to
pension receipt have a common baseline probability of retirement. By choosing the unit of
time to be years until pension eligibility, my baseline hazard answers my first research
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question about how teachers respond to the “pull” and “push” of pensions—and it does so in
a fully flexible, nonparametric way. Even though the baseline hazard is not estimated, it can
be calculated after estimation by setting all covariates equal to zero.
In the next section, I describe the literature on modeling pension incentives and provide
evidence that, despite receiving similar salaries, teachers with different levels of quality (the
value-added they bring to the job, or the competitiveness of the college they attended) or
working conditions vary in terms of their persistence in the workforce. This evidence suggests
that teachers’ responses to pension incentives may also vary along these dimensions. I use a
unique set of detailed data on every North Carolina teacher and student over 14 years, as
described in the third section. I can follow teachers over time and explore their responses to the
North Carolina retirement plan as they approach and pass pension receipt eligibility. These data
have several critical features that are often absent in other studies of retirement. First, I observe
characteristics of their workplace necessary to decipher whether teacher retirement behavior
differs by school characteristics, such as student demographics. Second, I link fourth- and fifthgrade teachers with their students who took end-of-grade achievement tests. This allows me to
evaluate a teacher’s quality in terms of her prior teaching performance, measured using teacher
value-added, to see how retirement behavior varies with teaching effectiveness.
I explain the North Carolina pension plan in the fourth section and describe how the
pension plan affects teachers’ retirement incentives. In the fifth section, I present my estimation
strategy and results, including the test of the proportionality assumption critical to the Cox
model. I conclude in the sixth section with some policy implications of this research.

My Contributions and Review of the Literature
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Modeling retirement incentives is complicated because the value of continuing to teach
includes the value of the having the option to continue one year later, two years later, and so on.
Rust (1989) and Berkovec and Stern (1991) model these incentives using a dynamic structural
model. Stock and Wise (1990) make some simplifying assumptions and approximate a dynamic
structural model using the “option value” approach where individuals continue to work because
they value the option of being able to retire later. Coile and Gruber (2007) further simplify the
dynamic nature of pensions by calculating just one number, the “peak value,” to symbolize the
option value of continuing to work. The peak value is how much an individual’s pension wealth
would grow should she continue working until she reached the peak of her pension wealth.
Economists have also used hazard models to study retirement (e.g., Hausman and Wise
1985). In an appendix to an earlier version of their 1990 published paper, Stock and Wise (1988)
show that a hazard model can be thought of as a simplified version of their option value model,
which is derived from utility maximization. I argue that there are advantages to using a hazard
model for measuring teacher responses under one pension system. The main sources of variation
in peak value across individuals of the same age and tenure are due to differences in pension plan
rules or differences in earnings. Nationally representative data have variation across these two
margins; state-level teacher data likely do not. Pension plans are often administered at the state
level; salaries are also usually determined at the state level, with small differences at the district
level, where everyone generally receives the same bump in salary. The only meaningful variable
that is driving peak value differences is the number of years a teacher has until she is eligible for
full pension benefits. I look at how retirement behavior is affected simply by the number of years
until a teacher is eligible for full pension benefits, bypassing the assumptions about how
individuals discount future wealth and the relevance of peak value to a teacher’s decision.
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Teachers are arguably very cognizant of the number of years they have left, making it a simple,
realistic variable that would naturally affect retirement behavior and is driven by the pension
rules.
A few studies examine teacher pension incentives (Costrell and McGee 2010; Costrell
and Podgursky 2009; Friedberg and Turner 2010) and describe how pension wealth accrues over
a teacher’s career, sometimes creating incentives to pull them to stay in teaching, and sometimes
pushing them out. The pension pull is caused by an increase in the annuity due to additional
experience and salary, and by an increase in the present discounted value of a teacher’s pension
because she is eligible to begin receiving the annuity sooner. After eligibility for her pension, the
pension “push” is caused by the high cost of forgone pension benefits if she continues to teach.
Although these studies generally concur that teachers behave predictably in the face of pension
incentives, Fitzpatrick (2015) and Koedel and Xiang (2017) show that teachers likely value them
at much less than they cost.
Three papers build on the peak value approach in Coile and Gruber (2007) by measuring
differential responses among teachers: Costrell and McGee (2010), Friedberg and Turner (2011),
and Koedel, Podgursky, and Shi (2013). Costrell and McGee (2010) estimate peak value models
for Arkansas teachers and find that teachers are indeed responsive to peak value. Friedberg and
Turner (2011) use the peak value approach to model retirement in nationally representative data
in the Schools and Staffing Survey. They find evidence that teachers who are less satisfied with
their jobs are likely to delay retirement during the pension pull and then retire abruptly during the
pension push. My results suggest that the demographic composition of the school influences
teacher retirement, perhaps because it is correlated with teacher satisfaction. I also look at the
differences in retirement behavior by teacher value-added, and I find that high-value-added
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teachers are the least likely to leave during the pension pull but behave similarly to low-valueadded teachers during the pension push.
Koedel, Podgursky, and Shi (2013) examine the relationship between value-added and
retirement, but through a different lens. They do not leverage variation in pension wealth or peak
value, but instead use peak value to determine teacher type. Teacher type refers to whether one
ends up retiring very early in one’s career, around the time of pension receipt eligibility, or
several years after pension receipt eligibility. Koedel, Podgursky, and Shi estimate the valueadded of different types of teachers in Missouri using a student-level regression with indicators
for teacher type. They find no evidence of teacher type being associated with teacher quality.
Teachers who are still teaching at the end of their panel are included in the omitted category
because, at the time of analysis, it is unknown what teacher type they will become; thus, the
comparison group is a combination of teachers from the other teacher types. My hazard model
specification allows teachers with censored retirement to be included without making the
assumption that they are similar to one another. Instead, these teachers are simply counted as still
teaching and I make no supposition about when they might retire.
There are a growing number of papers examining the effects of changes in retirement
benefits (e.g., Fitzpatrick [2015]; Fitzpatrick and Lovenheim [2014]; Furgeson, Strauss, and
Vogt [2006]; Koedel and Xiang [2017]). The most closely related study is Fitzpatrick and
Lovenheim (2014), which finds that early retirement incentives have little effect on student test
scores and may increase scores in schools with a large proportion of economically disadvantaged
students. My results complement theirs in that I find that low-value-added teachers are the least
attached to their jobs during the pension pull.
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My study adds to a large body of literature on teacher retention, which most often has
studied teachers who are early in their careers. Many papers study the effect of current
compensation on teacher turnover using variation in pay scales across districts, which may be
endogenous, or using salaries in alternative occupations, which are difficult to accurately
measure (e.g., Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin [2004]; Podgursky, Monroe, and Watson [2004]). I
use variation in benefit eligibility thresholds, which are primarily driven by exogenous factors
such as a teacher’s age and years of experience.
Another branch of literature focuses specifically on the quality of retained teachers.
These studies show that teacher retention varies by teachers’ general-knowledge test scores and
the competitiveness of the college attended, finding that those with better credentials are more
likely to exit (Boyd et al. 2005; Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2002). Researchers have also
developed the value-added measure of quality, which is the average growth in achievement that a
teacher’s students experience during the school year (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005). Many
studies compare the value-added measures of exiting early-career teachers to the measures of
those who stay. These studies find that those with higher value-added are more likely to stay
(e.g., Boyd et al. [2007]; Goldhaber, Gross, and Player [2011]). I study the behavior of mid- and
later-career teachers with respect to their qualifications, and I measure their value-added over
multiple years to get a more informed measurement of a teacher’s effectiveness.1
Researchers have additionally studied the sorting of different types of teachers across
schools, concluding that schools with more disadvantaged students are likely to have high
teacher turnover and generally less effective teachers (Boyd et al. 2007; Clotfelter, Ladd, and

1

Rothstein (2009) notes the bias introduced in value-added measures due to the nonrandom assignment of students
and teachers. Koedel and Betts (2011) show that measuring value-added with many years of data, as I do, reduces
this bias.
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Vigdor 2006). I find that teachers in hard-to-staff schools are more likely to leave during both the
pension pull and the pension push, and that less effective teachers are more likely than their
effective counterparts to leave during the pull.
As stated above, many of my contributions are the result of an exceptionally detailed and
encompassing data set and of rethinking the hazard model specification. I describe the specifics
of the data in the next section and motivate the hazard model specification in the section after
that.

Data
I use data from administrative records of all North Carolina public school students and
teachers over the 1994–1995 through 2010–2011 school years, maintained by the North Carolina
Education Research Data Center. These records include key individual and aggregate
characteristics, follow individuals over time, and link students and teachers in school classrooms.
I describe my sample selection process (Table 1), possible sources of measurement error,
estimation strategy for teacher value-added (Table 2), and summary statistics of key variables
(Table 3).2
I make two consequential exclusions in order to ensure that my model is properly
specified. First, I am interested in teachers’ exit behavior as it relates to pension incentives;
therefore, I exclude teachers with less than five years of experience because they are not vested
in the pension plan. Given that I see only the presence or absence of a teacher in the
administrative data, I have to infer whether her absence is due to leaving teaching permanently

2

I include those who have ever been full-time teachers with greater than five years of experience (making them
eligible for the defined benefit pension plan) if their date of college graduation and other demographic variables are
given, and if they have worked in a single school with nonzero salary during each year in the data.
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(exited) or only temporarily. I define teachers as having exited if they are not observed as fulltime employees in the North Carolina data for two consecutive years.3 I also exclude spells of
employment for anyone under 40 years old, when the pension pull is likely very small, as they
have at least 10 more years before they will be eligible for their pension. Exits from (and reentry
to) teaching during a person’s twenties and thirties may be correlated with child-rearing, a factor
outside the scope of my model that could result in a temporary absence that is longer than two
years, leading me to misclassify them as having exited when they have not.
Second, as explained in the section on “Estimation Strategy and Results,” a critical
assumption of a proportional Cox model is that all covariates must affect the baseline hazard
proportionally. There are two teacher characteristics that did not satisfy basic tests of this
proportionality assumption, likely because they are correlated with other factors that influence
retirement, such as household assets or marital status. One is teacher gender. It appears that the
baseline hazard for men is not proportional to the baseline hazard for women, implying that men
have a different underlying attachment to teaching. Excluding men from the analysis leaves 81
percent of teachers. The other is the pension eligibility threshold that a teacher is approaching. In
North Carolina, teachers are eligible for full pension benefits once they reach the earliest of three
thresholds: 1) 30 years of service, 2) age 60 with 25 years of service, or 3) age 65 with 5 years of
service. Some 78 percent of teachers reach the first threshold (30 years of service) before the
others, meaning they started teaching in their twenties or early thirties. Those who reach the
other two thresholds first did not start teaching until much later. While the inclusion of
individuals across all three thresholds provides valuable variation in age, it also results in the age

3

A drawback of this definition of “exited” is that the last two years of data (2009–2010 and 2010–2011) cannot be
included in the analysis because there are not two later years that can be used to distinguish between temporary and
permanent leaves of absence.
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covariate violating the proportionality assumption. Teachers who start teaching at a later age may
be systematically different, resulting in a different hazard rate. Exploring the retirement behavior
of men and those who started teaching at later ages could be a topic of future research but is less
applicable to the behavior of teachers overall. After these exclusions, my sample size is 29,799
(58 percent) full-time female teachers.
I require that each individual in the sample have reasonable values for key covariates,
including age, experience, and salary, and that each individual continually work as a teacher (as
opposed to an administrator or staff member) during her tenure. I classify schools according to
the lowest and highest grade levels of the school in the Common Core of Data (CCD) each year:
elementary (PK–1 to 1–8), middle (4–7 to 5–9), and high (7–12 to 12) Thus, for instance, if the
earliest grade falls between prekindergarten and 1 and the latest grade in the school is between 1
and 8, then it is classified as an elementary school. If the data on student characteristics are
missing, I impute the value from the closest nonmissing year for that school. I lack data on the
demographic composition of some schools, leading me to exclude less than 2 percent of teachers.
I standardize measures of school demographics for each school level. For example, I use the
mean and standard deviation of the proportion of black students in a school across all years. I
standardize within school level because schools with lower grades tend to be smaller and more
homogeneous than large high schools. I associate teachers with the competitiveness of the
institution from which they received their undergraduate degree, where competitiveness is
measured according to Barron’s rankings of “Most Competitive Schools” from the year closest
to their graduation date (1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, or 1992). “Less competitive” is a Barron’s
rating of either noncompetitive or less competitive; “competitive” is a rating of competitive; and
“more competitive” is a rating of either more competitive or very competitive.
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Although the data are quite rich, there are two limitations that affect the precision with
which I can measure eligibility for full pension receipt. First, there is measurement error in my
principal measure for pension eligibility, the number of years of service. A suitable proxy for
years of service is years of experience, which I can identify given an individual’s salary step;
however, some teachers may have credit for additional years of service beyond their years of
experience because of work in other state agencies or credit for unused personal or sick days.
Second, I do not observe a teacher’s age, but I do know the year she graduated from college. I
impute age assuming she is 21 upon college graduation. Both measurement error in age and
years of service imply that there are some individuals who are eligible for pension benefits
whom I label as ineligible. The issue with age is less critical, given that I limit my sample to
those who are approaching the 30-years-of-service threshold.
An integral part of my analysis is in identifying a teacher’s quality using value-added
measures. The sample of teachers that I am able to link with end-of-grade math and reading
scores is the subset of 3,828 of these teachers who taught fourth or fifth grade during the 1998–
1999 and 2007–2008 school years. I choose this subset because of two data limitations. First,
student end-of-grade scores are associated with the teacher who proctored the exam. In
elementary school grades (third through fifth, which are the elementary grades that take tests),
the proctor is likely to be the student’s instructor for math and reading, because students are
generally with one teacher for most of the day. In sixth through eighth grades, the proctor may
not be the student’s instructor for math or reading; instead, it is likely that students are proctored
by their homeroom teacher, who may instruct them in another subject. I follow Xu, Hannaway,
and Taylor (2007) and compare the student composition (class size, number of white students,
number of male students) of the tested class with that of the class that the proctor instructs (data
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from a separate source). If the characteristics of tested classroom are similar to the instructor’s
classroom, then I deem the proctor to also be the instructor. Second, in order to calculate a
teacher’s value-added, I need her students’ prior test scores and demographic characteristics. The
prior test scores of third-grade students are unavailable because there is no test prior to third
grade, so I exclude third-grade teachers from my value-added analysis. The available student
demographic data varies from year to year, and only the 1998–1999 through 2007–2008 school
years contain the student information that I include in my value-added specification. I exclude
classes with fewer than 10 or more than 40 students. Across all years, teachers for whom I
calculate value-added have between 10 and 252 students in all of their classes combined, with
the average being 72.
I measure teacher value-added, under the variable 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖 , as a time-invariant trait
related to the average growth of student standardized achievement scores for a particular teacher
relative to the growth of other teachers’ student scores after netting out the average effects of
other observable factors (Table 2). To address concerns about bias in value-added measures, I
follow Koedel and Betts (2011) and estimate a teacher’s value-added using the test scores of her
students over multiple years:
(1)

𝐴𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝒀𝑗𝑡 𝝆 + 𝜈𝑗𝑖𝑡 .

The dependent variable is the normalized test score 𝐴𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑖𝑡 of student 𝑗 of teacher 𝑖 in
year 𝑡. I regress this on a vector of student, class, and school attributes 𝒀, which includes student
𝑗’s test score from the previous year, demographic and achievement measures for other students
in 𝑗’s classroom and school, and grade and year fixed effects. I do not include teacher experience
in this specification. It is well established by the literature (Boyd et al. 2008; Rockoff 2004) that
teachers’ value-added increases as they gain experience, especially in the first few years of
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teaching. Teachers included in the value-added specification are in their fifth or more year of
teaching, so it is likely that these teachers have little variation in quality because of increases in
experience. Additionally, the most policy-relevant comparison is to compare the retirement
behavior of all teachers to one another. If I controlled for experience, the measure would only
compare a teacher to her same-experienced peers. In the case of a teacher with 34 years of
experience, this would only be those who also stayed four years past pension eligibility, which is
a select group of teachers. Because my value-added measure compares all non-novice teachers to
one another, I am able to describe the effect of value-added on the selection that caused some
teachers to stay until they had 34 years of experience. I exclude school fixed effects because I
want to compare the retirement behavior of individuals with different value-added measures
across, not within, schools. I use empirical Bayes shrinkage (Value-Added Research Center
2010) to account for measurement error in the value-added estimates, although using an
estimated coefficient as a covariate will admittedly be tenuous even after shrinkage.
I have value-added measures for 3,730 teachers, 12.5 percent of my analytic sample.
Because there are separate math and reading tests, I compute a teacher’s average value-added,
the average of reading and math. The shrunken standard deviation of these measures is in line
with other estimates from other value-added research—0.19 for math and 0.10 for reading—as
are the magnitude and significance of covariates in the value-added regression (Table 2) (e.g.,
Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor [2007]; Hanushek and Rivkin [2010]).4 In order to ease
interpretation of value-added in my hazard model specification, I use a standardized measure so
that teachers whose value-added is one standard deviation above the mean have a value-added
equal to one.

4

The standard deviation of value-added may differ from other estimates because novice teachers are excluded,
teacher experience is not accounted for, and there are no school or school-by-year fixed effects.
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Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for teachers in the beginning and end of the time
period I study for the full sample as well as the sample for whom I have value-added. As is
consistent with the large cohort of baby boomers moving toward retirement, the average teacher
age, experience, and teaching salary are increasing over time. Over half of teachers in the full
sample are in elementary schools, with the remaining half split between middle and high school.
Teachers in the value-added sample are primarily in elementary schools because these are
individuals who have taught fourth or fifth grade. Most teachers attended colleges that fell into
the “competitive” or “less competitive” categories, and around 40 percent have degrees beyond a
bachelor’s. The vast majority are white.

Modeling Retirement Incentives
Teachers in North Carolina and most other states are eligible for a defined benefit
pension plan that provides an annuity paid regularly after they retire from teaching. This annuity
equals 1.82 percent of the average salary of their last four years, multiplied by the years of
service in North Carolina public schools. These retirement benefits make up a large portion of a
teacher’s total compensation; for instance, a 30-year teacher receives over half of her highest
salary each year following retirement.5 Teachers are entitled to full pension benefits when they
reach certain age-experience thresholds: 30 years of service, age 60 with 25 years of service, or
age 65 with 5 years of service.6 As described in the third section, I limit my sample to teachers
who will first become eligible for pension benefits at the 30-years-of-service threshold.

5

Teachers in North Carolina are also eligible for Social Security.
Teachers can retire short of these thresholds and receive a reduced benefit. Reduced benefit eligibility: age 50 with
25 years of teaching, or age 60 with 5 years of teaching. Benefits are reduced by 3–5 percent per year short of full
retirement threshold, depending on age at retirement. Note: a teacher may retire before reaching an age threshold but
not receive benefits until her age and experience are past the threshold—e.g., a 58-year-old could retire after her
6
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Any promise of wealth or income after retirement is likely to affect teacher exit behavior.
It is important to isolate the “push” and “pull” effects of defined benefit pensions from the
overall income effects. The income effect can be summarized by the pension’s present
discounted value, called “pension wealth.” Figure 1A shows pension wealth as a function of her
experience at the time of exit for a hypothetical North Carolina teacher who starts teaching at age
21. Figure 1B shows how much pension wealth accrues at each level of experience. This defined
benefit plan provides incentives to continue teaching up until one reaches 30 years of experience
(52 years old) and can begin to receive her annuity immediately upon exiting teaching. Before a
teacher reaches 30 years of experience, her pension wealth increases for several reasons. First, as
is true throughout her career, an additional year of work, along with any associated increase in
salary, significantly raises the annuity amount. Second, during this period, pension wealth
increases because she is closer to receiving her benefits—one more year of work implies (at
least) one less year she must wait to get her annuity. The accrual rate is at its highest when she
has 27 years of experience, at which point she would receive an additional $56,000 worth of
pension wealth for teaching just one more year. This additional pension wealth may “pull” her to
continue teaching. Once she reaches 30 years of experience (age 52) she can receive her annuity
immediately upon exiting teaching, at which point the accrual drops from $38,000 to $15,000. If
she continues to work, the annuity amount would still increase, but her pension accrual
nonetheless declines because each additional year of teaching imposes an implicit cost—it is one
less year that she could be receiving benefits. After 42 years of experience (age 65), this cost
exceeds the additional annuity amount, making the accrual negative. These decreased accruals

twenty-fifth year and receive reduced benefits immediately and thereafter, or wait two years and get full benefits
upon turning 60.
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after one has attained 30 years of experience may “push” her out of teaching because they are
either not worth waiting for or they effectively decrease the value of her retirement income.
In contrast, the accruals in a defined contribution plan are relatively flat and
(theoretically) never decline. Defined contribution plans do have set rules for when a person can
have access to her retirement account (generally after age 59½). Early access is possible by
paying an early withdrawal penalty, exercising a withdrawal due to hardship, or borrowing
against the retirement funds. Thus, these strict pension eligibility thresholds and sharp, changing
accrual patterns are characteristics of defined benefit pensions alone.
In a defined benefit plan, the relative value of continuing to teach depends on how long
one intends to teach. For example, someone who does not intend to stay until pension eligibility
should not be prevented by the utility gains from staying until then. This attachment to teaching
likely varies with teachers’ attributes, causing individuals with different characteristics to
respond differently to retirement incentives. For example, teachers may have different
predilections for their work because they enjoy teaching, get satisfaction from being an effective
teacher, or have a fondness for a particular school environment. Teachers with high
nonpecuniary benefits would be less influenced by the value of pension accruals as they relate to
the teachers’ retirement decisions, making them less sensitive to both the pull and the push of
pensions. On the other hand, teachers with talents that are highly valued in alternative
professions may be less sensitive to the pension pull but more sensitive to the pension push
because the opportunity cost of teaching is high. To capture differences in responsiveness to
pension incentives, I see how hazard rates vary with characteristics like teacher quality, having
an advanced degree, teaching different grades, and student demographics.
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While the value and growth in pension wealth can describe the magnitude of pension
incentives in great detail, pension eligibility thresholds effectively capture the same incentives,
are more salient to individual teachers, and require fewer assumptions about individuals’
discount rates or expectations about future salaries. Figure 2 shows the pension wealth for three
hypothetical teachers that represent the spectrum of teachers in my sample. Around threequarters of my sample begin teaching prior to age 25, while the remaining quarter begin by the
time they are 30. Because of their different start ages, the teachers have different pension wealth
distributions and vary in the year in which they are eligible for pension receipt as well as the
accrual rates. Figure 2A shows these pension wealth distributions indexed by age. Figure 2B
shows them indexed by pension eligibility: the number of years an individual has been eligible to
receive full benefits immediately upon exiting teaching. While there are still differences across
teachers with different start ages, there are many similarities, including the timing of large versus
small pension accruals.
Using pension eligibility instead of pension wealth could disregard some potentially
important details. First, if teachers were not paid according to a rigid, statewide salary scale, then
their pension wealth distributions could vary substantially. Second, if teachers were subject to
different pension systems across the state, then the pension growth patterns could be noticeably
distinct from one another. These situations, which are easily found when comparing individual
behavior across states or employers, could create meaningful differences within a given level of
pension eligibility that should not be ignored. However, these factors are stable across many
public pension systems, including those for emergency and safety personnel as well as
government employees. In addition, I include controls for age and salary per month to account
for these small differences in pension wealth conditional on pension eligibility, as well as the
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effects of these variables on retirement through other channels (such as an increasing value of
leisure).
Figure 3A shows teachers’ hazard rate by years of experience and pension eligibility.
This is the marginal proportion of teachers who exit at each experience level, conditional on
working up to that point. Figure 3B shows the survival function, the proportion of teachers with
20 years of experience who are still working at each level of experience—in other words, the
cumulative effect of the hazard rate. The large jump in the hazard rate starts at 29 years of
experience, one year short of the 30-year threshold. Theoretically, this is when the incentive to
exit teaching is very low, as waiting just one more year entitles you to full pension benefits upon
leaving. Leaving one year shy of this threshold implies you must wait to receive pension benefits
until you age into the next threshold (age 60 and 25 years of service), which could be as many as
nine more years. I suspect that there is measurement error, in that years of experience is not the
perfect proxy for years of service. Although I do not have the data to test this hypothesis, the
likely culprit for this error is that teachers can take their unused sick days and turn them in as
years of service on top of their existing years of experience. Teachers can have as many unused
sick days as would equal a full school year, leading to this discrepancy. I cannot identify how
many unused sick days a teacher has, making it impossible to correct this issue. Instead, I
analyze exit behavior for those with 20 to 28 years of experience (pension eligibility −10 to −2,
or between 10 and 2 years until eligibility), and those with 30 to 35 years of experience (pension
eligibility 0 to 5, or having been eligible for zero to five years), omitting the suspect year.
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Estimation Strategy and Results
As discussed in the previous section, given that salaries are generally fixed by the
state and the pension system is statewide, I find that the number of years a teacher must
work before she is eligible for her full pension benefit is the major driver of variation in
pension wealth. I depart from other models of teacher retirement by using a Cox
proportional hazard model, which changes the effective unit of analysis from a teacher’s
year-by-year retirement decision to a teacher’s entire spell of employment. Binary models,
such as a logit or probit, ignore the effect of time, treating the retirement decision every year
as an independent decision related to different values of covariates. I define the unit of time
as the number of years until full pension receipt eligibility, which means all teachers who
have the same number of years to pension receipt have a common baseline probability of
retirement, 𝜆0 (𝑡). The functional form of the baseline hazard is not specified, meaning it can
have sharp spikes or a smooth curve, depending on what fits the data. The model is shown in
Equation (2):
(2)

𝜆(𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝜆0 (𝑡) ∙ exp(𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽) .

A strength of the Cox proportional hazard model is that it explicitly handles censored
data, meaning that individuals who had not yet retired at the end of my panel are properly
included in estimating the effects of the covariates. Through a process known as
stratification, these models can flexibly account for local labor market conditions by
allowing individuals in different school districts (i.e., local education agencies) to have
distinct baseline hazards. For example, a teacher in a rural district may be more attached to
teaching regardless of pension eligibility simply because there are not a lot of other jobs
available. Similarly, I stratify by school year to account for statewide variation in school
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policies (e.g., the No Child Left Behind Act) or sweeping changes in job availability (e.g.,
the Great Recession).7 Stratification is akin to fixed effects, but because the baseline hazard
is not parametrically identified, I cannot test the significance of differences across years or
districts. I cluster standard errors at the teacher level.
A limitation of the proportional hazard model is the assumption that all covariates
have a proportional effect on the baseline hazard. This can be tested by whether the slope of
Schoenfeld residuals with respect to time is zero. To satisfy the proportional hazard
assumption, the individuals in the sample need to be reasonably similar. In the literature
review section, I describe why this implies that I focus solely on women who first reach
pension eligibility when they have 30 years of service. A consequence of the latter provision
is that I cannot separately control for experience. A second issue is that in years prior to
2007–2008, the last salary step is 30 years of experience and over, meaning that teachers
will still likely get paid more if they teach the following year, but only because of an
increase in the overall salary schedule, not a salary step.
I analyze the pension “pull” and “push” separately, allowing covariates to affect the
baseline hazard in different ways depending on whether the teacher is not yet eligible for her
pension or past eligibility. I exclude the year just prior to pension eligibility because of the
measurement error described in the fourth section.
The results in Tables 4 and 5 are presented as hazard ratios. A hazard ratio of 1
implies that individuals with different values of this covariate have the same hazard of
retirement. Note that even a large proportional effect on the baseline hazard is ultimately a

7

There was a policy in place from 1999 to 2009 in which North Carolina allowed retired teachers to return to work.
My preliminary results suggest that, because the policy was constantly on the verge of being ended, it did not affect
selection into retirement in a meaningful way. Nonetheless, flexibly controlling for year effects should negate the
effects of this policy.
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small effect if the baseline hazard is small. As shown in Figure 4, the baseline hazard prior
to pension eligibility is below 0.06. This implies that fewer than 6 percent of teachers leave
each year prior to pension eligibility. Figure 5 shows that the baseline hazard after eligibility
is consistently over 0.22 for the full sample, yet consistently below 0.22 for the value-added
sample—sometimes as low as 0.07. Note that because I drop the year prior to pension
eligibility, I cannot calculate the survival function posteligibility conditional on teaching 10
years prior to eligibility (as in Figure 4B). Instead, I show the survival function as a function
of those who were teaching at pension eligibility.
First, I discuss my results during the years leading up to pension eligibility (Table 4).
The three columns have the results for value-added teachers only (1) and for two
specifications with all teachers (2 and 3). Across all specifications, a one-year increase in
age is associated with a 9 percent higher likelihood of retirement. An increase in salary of
$100 per month decreases the likelihood of retirement by at least 5 percent. Having a
master’s degree or higher could represent additional general human capital, as those with
advanced degrees are 27 to 67 percent more likely to leave than their bachelor’s degree
counterparts. Teachers who attended competitive colleges are less likely to leave than their
colleagues who went to either less competitive or more competitive colleges. Nonwhite
teachers are over 20 percent less likely to retire than their white counterparts.
Teachers with value-added one standard deviation above the mean are 20 percent
less likely to retire than average teachers. Perhaps the pension “pull” is not strong enough to
keep those who might be dissatisfied with their jobs because they are not as successful (as
measured with this metric). As shown in Figure 6A, the hazard rate for teachers whose
value-added is −1, 0, or 1 standard deviations above the mean does not look very different;
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however, these small differences in hazard rates result in 8 percent more high-value-added
teachers than low-value-added teachers (86 versus 78) continuing in the classroom until
almost eligible for their pension.
With respect to school characteristics, middle-school teachers are 14 percent more
likely to leave than high-school or elementary-school teachers. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the proportion of students in the school who are economically disadvantaged
leads to a 9-to-10 percent increase in retirement. A one-standard-deviation increase in the
proportion of black students leads to an 11 percent increase in retirement for middle-school
teachers but no significant difference in elementary or high school exits.
Table 5 includes the hazard ratios for teachers once they are eligible for their
pension; these hazard ratios show more similarities than differences across teachers. Note
that even though the effects on the covariates are generally smaller than during the pension
pull, the overall effects may be larger because the baseline hazard is approximately five
times larger. This specification is slightly different from the one in Table 4 because age2 is
an additional covariate. I found that when age2 was excluded from the covariates, the
specification failed the proportional hazards test. As with the results before pension
eligibility, increased age increases retirement probability; however, after one becomes
eligible for a pension, an increase in age increases retirement probability at a higher rate.
Specifically, depending on the specification, the hazard rate increases by 3 to 4 percent more
for each additional year. An increase of $100 per month in salary only decreases retirement
by 3 percent (instead of 5). As with the pension pull, nonwhite teachers are less likely to
leave than white teachers. Teachers who attended less competitive colleges are 7 percent
less likely to leave after pension eligibility, perhaps because they have lower human capital
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and fewer alternative job prospects. There are no differences in retirement probability by
value-added, meaning pensions are “pushing” out good teachers and bad teachers at the
same rates.
Retirement behavior across racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic student characteristics
does not reveal any pronounced pattern. Again, middle-school teachers have some different
responses to pensions. Although teachers from all levels of schools have a similar likelihood
of retiring, middle-school teachers in schools with a one-standard-deviation increase in
black students are less likely to leave than teachers in the average school. This may be due
to the selection out of these schools prior to pension eligibility. Teachers in middle and high
schools with a one-standard-deviation higher proportion of economically disadvantaged
students are around 7 to 8 percent more likely to leave.

Summary and Policy Implications
I argue that a Cox proportional hazard model is a suitable, simple, and realistic way to
estimate retirement behavior when all employees are subject to a similar salary schedule and
pension rules. I find that North Carolina teachers are very responsive to pension incentives: few
leave in the 10 years prior to pension eligibility, and many leave upon or after attaining
eligibility. As expected, younger and more highly paid teachers are more attached to the
workforce throughout the pension pull and push. The current pension pull is strongest for
teachers who have high value-added and those who are not white. I provide evidence that
teachers with higher levels of general human capital (as measured by having an advanced
degree) are more likely to leave during the pension “pull,” and teachers with lower levels of
general human capital (as measured by attending less competitive colleges) are least likely to
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leave during the pension “push.” Teachers’ retirement behavior is affected by student
demographic composition, as teachers are more likely to exit when teaching at a school with a
higher proportion of economically disadvantaged students; however, my model cannot show
what the counterfactual scenario would be if the pension “pull” were not in place—it could be
that the retirement rate in hard-to-staff schools would be even higher than it is now. Overall,
pension eligibility is a strong, salient driver of teacher retirement behavior. Given that teachers
have different responses to the current defined benefit plan incentives, they will likely have
different responses to any proposed changes to defined contribution plans as well.
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Table 1 Sample Selection

Full-time, vested teachers over the age of 40 with 10 years or less
until eligible for full pension benefit
Not in sample because:
Unknown/unreasonable salary or hours worked
Unreasonable/inconsistent values of experience
Unreasonable/unknown value of age
Unknown sex or race/ethnicity
Unknown school characteristics
Unknown college competitiveness
Able to retire with less than 30 years of experience
In analytic sample:

N
51,470

%
100

765
1,281
6,061
2,852
982
1,103
8,627
29,799

1.5
2.5
11.8
5.5
1.9
2.1
16.8
57.9

NOTE: All North Carolina public schoolteachers employed between 1994–1995 and 2008–2009 school years. Teachers are
vested after five years of service. I have value-added measures for 3,730 teachers in the analytic sample (12.5 percent of the
analytic sample).
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Table 2 Teacher Value-Added Specification
Dependent variable = standardized (mean 0, std. dev. 1 in grade and year) end-of-grade test score
Math
Reading
0.740
***
0.695
***
Previous score (standardized by grade and year)
(0.001)
(0.001)
−0.010 ***
0.015 ***
Female
(0.001)
(0.001)
−0.099 ***
−0.131 ***
Black
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.014 ***
−0.027 ***
Hispanic
(0.003)
(0.003)
0.010 ***
−0.023 ***
Other race
(0.003)
(0.003)
−0.020 ***
−0.063 ***
Limited English proficiency status
(0.005)
(0.005)
−0.071
***
−0.091 ***
Economically disadvantaged
(0.001)
(0.002)
Student variables
X
X
(switching schools, repeating a grade, age in third grade)
Year indicators
X
X
Grade 4 indicator
X
X
Student exceptionality status (gifted, speech or language
disability, physical disability, emotional disability, mental
X
X
disability, learning disability, or other disability indicators)
Class-level variables (membership, lagged achievement, %
X
X
nonwhite, % female, % LEP, % economically disadvantaged)
School-level variables (% black, % Hispanic, % economically
X
X
disadvantaged, school undergoing structural change)
N (student test scores)
778,734
783,572
R-squared
0.75
0.69
NOTE: Sample is made up of students of all North Carolina public schoolteachers teaching between 10 and 40 students
in a given year who took the fourth or fifth grade end-of-grade test between 1999–2000 and 2008–2009 (the years in
which all independent variables are available). Value-added is measured at the teacher level. Standard errors shown in
parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***
significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). The standard deviation of value-added is 0.22 (math), 0.15 (reading), and
0.17 (average) prior to Bayes shrinkage. After shrinkage, the standard deviations are 0.19 (math), 0.10 (reading), and
0.13 (average). “LEP” = “limited English proficiency.”
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample and Value-Added Sample
Year
N
mean
std. dev.
min.
max.
mean
std. dev.
Age
(in fall)
min.
max.
mean
std. dev.
Salary per
month/$100
min.
max.
% attended college rated as
More competitive
Competitive
Less competitive
B.A. degree
M.A. degree and above
White
Nonwhite
Teaches at a school with
mean
std. dev.
% black
students
min.
max.
mean
% economically
std. dev.
disadvantaged
min.
students
max.
Elementary
Middle
High
Experience
(in fall)

Full sample
1995–1996
2008–2009
14,359
12,034
23.9
25.5
3.8
4.2
19
19
34
34
47.5
49.8
4.4
4.6
40
40
63
64
34.5
50.7
2.5
4.8
21.0
29.8
42.2
66.7

Value-added sample
1995–1996
2008–2009
1,567
1,736
22.9
25.4
3.1
4.2
19
19
34
34
46.3
49.6
3.6
4.7
40
40
60
63
33.9
50.7
2.2
4.6
29.4
43.5
40.9
66.7

5.2
50.7
44.1
58.5
41.5
79.3
20.7

8.0
51.0
41.0
57.5
42.5
83.3
16.7

3.8
51.9
44.4
57.9
42.1
78.6
21.4

8.2
44.7
47.1
56.7
43.3
79.9
20.1

30.0
22.3
0
99.9
30.0
17.5
0
94.4
57.1
18.8
24.1

26.9
22.5
0
100.0
36.8
19.1
0.2
96.5
56.6
20.7
22.6

29.1
23.6
0
99.7
34.9
17.7
0
90.2
94.1
5.6
0.3

26.6
23.1
0
98.1
39.7
20.6
0.2
96.5
90.8
8.7
0.5

NOTE: Descriptive statistics in the first and last years for the 29,799 teachers in the full sample and the 3,730 of those for whom
I can calculate value-added.
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Table 4 Hazard Ratios Pre–Pension Eligibility

Age
Salary per month/$100
M.A. degree and above
Nonwhite
% black students in school
(standardized)
% economically
disadvantaged students in
school (standardized)
Teacher value-added
(standardized)
Attended more competitive
college
Attended less competitive
college
Middle school
High school

Value-added
1.0939 ***
(0.0254)
0.9277 *
(0.0362)
1.665 **
(0.3307)
0.7356 *
(0.1312)
1.0179
(0.1271)
1.0937

All teachers
1.0962 ***
(0.0069)
0.9483 ***
(0.0096)
1.269 ***
(0.0615)
0.7887 ***
(0.0388)
1.0863 **
(0.0384)
1.086 ***

(0.1223)
0.7933
(0.0467)
1.1779
(0.1577)
1.6715
(0.3442)
1.0764
(0.2400)
0.4911
(0.3300)

(0.0347)

All teachers with
interactions
1.0963 ***
(0.0069)
0.9486 ***
(0.0096)
1.2681 ***
(0.0615)
0.7854 ***
(0.0388)
1.0648
(0.0424)
1.0939 **
(0.0388)

***
1.1161
(0.0402)
1.1325
(0.0675)
1.1465
(0.0444)
1.0207
(0.0400)

**

146,782
26,437
4,332
−12246

1.1175
(0.0402)
1.1339
(0.0675)
1.1405
(0.0452)
1.0148
(0.0423)
1.1134
(0.0595)
1.0021
(0.0518)
0.9694
(0.0537)
0.976
(0.0584)
146,782
26,437
4,332
−12243

14.17
10
0.17

16.12
14
0.31

Middle school × % black
High school × % black
Middle school × %
economically disadvantaged
High school × %
economically disadvantaged
N of observations
20,402
N of subjects
3,482
N of failures
413
Log pseudolikelihood
−441.2
Schoenfeld residual test of proportional hazards assumption
Chi2
3.39
Degrees of freedom
11
Prob > chi2
0.98

***
**
***

***
**
***

**

NOTE: Standard errors shown in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level
(two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Hazard ratio > 1 implies higher likelihood of retirement;
< 1 implies lower likelihood of retirement. Sample is composed of all teachers with between 10 and 2 years to go until
pension eligibility.
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Table 5 Hazard Ratios Post–Pension Eligibility

Age
Age2
Salary per month/$100
M.A. degree and above
Nonwhite
% black students in school (standardized)
% economically disadvantaged students in
school (standardized)
Teacher value-added (standardized)
Attended more competitive college
Attended less competitive college
Middle school
High school

Value-added
0.1086 ***
(0.0551)
1.0201 ***
(0.0047)
0.9696
(0.0212)
1.0031
(0.1205)
0.9508
(0.0873)
0.9434
(0.0623)
0.983
(0.0577)
0.9989
(0.0331)
0.9478
(0.0712)
1.2376
(0.1891)
0.8129
(0.1127)
0.4243
(0.3350)

All teachers
0.1825 ***
(0.0223)
1.0153 ***
(0.0011)
0.9663 ***
(0.0056)
0.9708
(0.0302)
0.8859 ***
(0.0230)
0.9641 *
(0.0190)
1.0324 *
(0.0187)

0.9904
(0.0201)
0.9264
(0.0385)
0.9707
(0.0216)
0.974
(0.0202)

41,913
15,200
10,847
−23,942

0.99
(0.0201)
0.9279
(0.0385)
0.9753
(0.0221)
0.9831
(0.0208)
0.9334
(0.0289)
0.9791
(0.0275)
1.0697
(0.0333)
1.0594
(0.0321)
41,913
15,200
10,847
−23,939

Middle school × % black
High school × % black
Middle school × % economically
disadvantaged
High school × % economically
disadvantaged
N of observations
5,588
N of subjects
1,883
N of failures
1,244
Log pseudolikelihood
−1,021.3
Schoenfeld residual test of proportional hazards assumption

All teachers with
interactions
0.1821 ***
(0.0222)
1.0153 ***
(0.0011)
0.9663 ***
(0.0056)
0.9722
(0.0302)
0.8871 ***
(0.0231)
0.9771
(0.0216)
1.0128
(0.0201)

*

Chi2
Degrees of freedom

3.45
12

11.57
11

13.47
15

Prob > chi2

0.99

0.40

0.57

*

**

**
*

NOTE: Standard errors shown in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (twotailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Hazard ratio > 1 implies higher likelihood of retirement; < 1 implies
lower likelihood of retirement. Sample is made up of all teachers who have been eligible for pension benefits for up to five years.
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Figure 1 Pension Wealth and Change in Pension Wealth by Experience

Panel A. Pension Wealth by Experience
Pension Wealth (in $100K)
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Panel B. Change in Pension Wealth for Each Additional Year of Teaching by Experience

Pension Wealth (in $100K)
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0
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55
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NOTE: Pension wealth for a hypothetical teacher who starts teaching at age 21 and faces the 2000–2001 North Carolina salary
schedule during her entire career. 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = ∑𝑇𝑠=𝑡 𝛽 𝑠−𝑡 𝜋𝑠|𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 , the pension wealth of individual 𝑖 who exits
teaching in year 𝑡 and receives annuity 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 multiplied by the probability 𝜋𝑠|𝑡 that one is alive in the later period 𝑠 to
receive that payment (conditional on being alive in period 𝑡). I assume 𝛽 to be 0.95. I calculate 𝜋𝑠|𝑡 using life tables by gender
and race (white, black, Hispanic, and other) from the National Center for Health Statistics for the year 2006 (Arias 2010a,b).
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Figure 2 Pension Wealth for Hypothetical Teachers by Age and Pension Eligibility

A. Pension Wealth by Age

B. Pension Wealth by Pension Eligibility
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ageB25
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NOTE: Pension wealth for hypothetical white females who started teaching at age 21, 25, and 29. This range includes the starting
age of approximately 70 percent of all teachers in the sample. I assume they are always paid according to the 2000–2001 salary
scale. The magnitude of pension eligibility corresponds to how many years an individual has until (if < 0) or since (if ≥ 0)
pension receipt eligibility.
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Figure 3 Hazard Rates and Survival Functions by Years of Experience
and Pension Eligibility

Panel A. Hazard Rate by Experience and Pension Eligibility
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Panel B. Survival Function by Experience and Pension Eligibility
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NOTE: Hazard rate is the marginal proportion of those leaving North Carolina public school teaching. Survival function is the
proportion of teachers working in North Carolina public schools at 10 years until eligibility who are still present at a given level
of pension eligibility. Graphs above include all individuals in analytic sample and do not control for any covariates.
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Figure 4 Estimated Hazard Rate and Survival Function Pre–Pension Eligibility

Panel A. Hazard Rate by Pension Eligibility
Full sample
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Panel B. Survival function by pension eligibility
Full sample
1

1

0.8

0.8

Survival Function

Survival Function

Value-added sample

0.6

0.4

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.2

0
-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0
0

-10

Pension Eligibility

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

Pension Eligibility

NOTE: Hazard rate is the marginal proportion of those leaving North Carolina public school teaching. Survival function is the
proportion of teachers working in North Carolina public schools at 10 years until eligibility who are still present at a given level
of pension eligibility. Graphs above are estimated using the average values for covariates for each level of pension eligibility and
coefficients from specifications (1) and (2) in Table 4.
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Figure 5 Estimated Hazard Rate and Survival Function Post–Pension Eligibility

Panel A. Hazard Rate by Pension Eligibility
Full sample
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Panel B. Survival Function by Pension Eligibility
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NOTE: Hazard rate is the marginal proportion of those leaving North Carolina public school teaching. Survival function is a ratio
where the denominator is the number of teachers working when they became eligible to receive their pension and the numerator
is the number who are still working at a given level of pension eligibility. Graphs above are estimated using the average values
for covariates for each level of pension eligibility and coefficients from specifications (1) and (2) in Table 5.
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Figure 6 Estimated Hazard Rate and Survival Function Pre–Pension Eligibility
by Teacher Value-Added

Panel A. Hazard Rate by Pension Eligibility
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B. Survival Function by Pension Eligibility
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NOTE: Hazard rate is the marginal proportion of those leaving North Carolina public school teaching. Survival function is the
proportion of teachers working in North Carolina public schools at 10 years until eligibility who are still present at a given level
of pension eligibility. Graphs above are estimated using the average values for covariates for each level of pension eligibility and
coefficients from specification (1) in Table 4, with value-added set to −1, 0, or 1.
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